

## EXPLOITING INEFFICIENCIES: HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET EFFICIENCY

**JANA STOCKBAUER**

*Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași  
Frankfurt am Main, Germany  
stockbauer.jana@gmail.com*

### **Abstract**

*The paper examines how hedge fund strategies exploit persistent market inefficiencies and evaluates the implications for the Efficient Market Hypothesis in both global and European financial markets. While the EMH traditionally asserts that asset prices fully reflect available information, empirical evidence increasingly shows that certain hedge funds consistently achieve abnormal returns, particularly during periods of market stress and dislocation. Using a cross-strategy perspective, spanning long/short equity, relative value, global macro, and event-driven funds, this study investigates how hedge funds identify and arbitrage pricing anomalies arising from behavioral biases, liquidity constraints, and institutional frictions.*

*Building on theoretical foundations in behavioral finance and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, the paper conducts a comparative analysis of hedge fund performance across multiple crisis periods, including the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Eurozone debt crisis, and the COVID-19 shock. Emphasis is placed on the structural characteristics of European markets, such as regulatory asymmetries, capital mobility, and the heterogeneity of investor behavior across EU member states. The results indicate that hedge funds demonstrate enhanced resilience and alpha generation precisely when markets deviate from informational efficiency, particularly in less liquid or segmented environments. These findings suggest that financial markets exhibit dynamic, context-dependent inefficiencies, which challenge the applicability of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in its stronger forms. Hedge funds, rather than being anomalies, may function as essential agents of price discovery in imperfect markets. The study contributes to ongoing debates about market efficiency, alternative asset management, and the evolving role of hedge funds within the European financial architecture.*

**Keywords:** hedge funds; financial stability; systematic risk; Efficient Market Hypothesis  
**JEL Classification:** G23.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

*“Hedge funds often make headlines because of spectacular losses or spectacular gains”*(Stulz, 2007, p. 175).

This is not the only quote stating the controversy and impact of the hedge fund industry (Asness *et al.*, 2001; Carroters, 2017; Eichengreen and Mathieson, 1999; Kruttli and Monion, 2013). It was found that “hedge funds seemed to be on the front page of every newspaper in the world” (Bloomberg, 2007; Edwards, 1999) stating their potential to “pose a threat to the stability of the entire financial system, once risks materialize” (Bussière *et al.*, 2015, p. 279).

Hedge funds in the European Union have faced unique challenges and recovery patterns compared to traditional asset classes, shaped by regulatory shifts and market dynamics. In the intricate landscape of modern finance, hedge funds represent a significant and often contentious component. The issue is not new (Haldane, 2014), however changing in size and shape. In the 1990s, hedge funds had grown to influence and shape financial markets. Even more influential than governments (Mallaby, 2019), in a world of increasing relations and dependencies. In response to international exposure to risks and policy implications, hedge funds (HFs) “may increase the risks to financial stability (Erede, 2013; King and Maier, 2009). The type of private, largely unregulated, and not supervised pools of capital are managed by competent investment firms, and they use plenty of complex methods to generate high returns for their investors, defined as “qualified purchasers” (Edwards, 1999, p. 190). Individuals who make more than two hundred thousand dollars a year or possess a net worth of more than one million dollars exclusively from their primary residence (Achleitner *et al.*, 2009).

Hedge funds serve several key functions in global financial markets. First, they contribute to market efficiency by identifying and exploiting pricing inefficiencies through sophisticated trading strategies such as arbitrage and event-driven investing (Adenigba, 1954). Thereby, hedge funds influence financial stability due to their growing impact and volatility. Many hedge fund strategies exhibit a low correlation with traditional asset classes such as equities and fixed income, making them an attractive investment for institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals seeking alternative sources of return (Stowell and Stowell, 2024).

The theoretical foundation for evaluating hedge funds’ role in market dynamics is often grounded in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which posits that financial markets fully and instantly reflect all available information in asset prices. According to Fama (1970), the EMH exists in three forms: weak, semi-strong, and strong, depending on the degree of information reflected in prices. Under these assumptions, consistent outperformance is considered impossible without taking on excess risk. However, hedge funds directly challenge this notion by persistently identifying pricing anomalies and exploiting

inefficiencies. Their ability to deliver alpha over extended periods, particularly during episodes of high volatility or structural shifts, suggests that markets may not be fully efficient in practice.

Additionally, hedge fund strategies often capitalize on behavioral biases, limited arbitrage, and information asymmetries – areas where the assumptions of EMH may not hold. Studies such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have argued that if markets were perfectly efficient, there would be no incentive to gather costly information, which paradoxically implies that inefficiencies must exist. Hedge funds' outperformance in niche segments such as distressed debt or emerging markets further underlines this critique. Therefore, hedge funds not only test the theoretical boundaries of the EMH but also provide practical evidence of episodic inefficiencies that can be systematically exploited.

Empirical research has examined the validity of the EMH using several statistical and econometric tests. Robert Shiller (1981) famously challenged the EMH by applying the variance bounds test, showing that stock price volatility exceeds what can be justified by fundamentals alone; a result inconsistent with the EMH. Andrew Lo (2004) proposed the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis as a refinement, suggesting that market efficiency is not static but evolves as investors adapt to changing environments. Fama himself contributed to empirical tests of EMH by analyzing abnormal returns in mutual funds and later recognizing that while markets are generally efficient, anomalies such as momentum and size effects persist. Other methods to test EMH include autocorrelation tests (for weak-form efficiency), event studies (for semi-strong form), and portfolio performance evaluations using Sharpe ratios and Jensen's alpha. Hedge funds often pass these tests with positive alpha, particularly in short- to medium-term horizons, suggesting a departure from perfect efficiency in real-world markets.

Overall, an extensive body of literature examines hedge funds from multiple perspectives, including their role in promoting market efficiency, their contribution to liquidity, and their potential to exacerbate financial instability. Scholars have debated whether hedge funds serve as stabilizers or destabilizers within financial markets (Lu *et al.*, 2024). On one hand, proponents argue that hedge funds enhance market efficiency through sophisticated arbitrage strategies, liquidity provision, and the active management of risk (Zhai and Wang, 2023). By capitalizing on misprice and market inefficiencies, hedge funds ostensibly contribute to a more accurate reflection of asset values and, in turn, to overall market stability.

### **1.1. Importance of hedge funds and financial stability**

The importance of hedge funds (the statistical units of the paper at hand) comes from the increasing size of the industry to USD 4.74 trillion in assets under management in the year 2024 with official predictions to grow to USD

5.47 trillion by 2029 (Goldstein, 2025). Other than the financial implications, the importance of the hedge fund industry also depends on its international basis, as the past showed major events that led to imbalances (Orlando, 2023). Thereby, HFs are an important price-setter and “reportedly dominate trading activities in the markets with broader economic importance” (King and Maier, 2009, p. 285). By trading a volume of 40 percent in the leveraged loan market and more than 85 percent of distressed debt, they are the “key players in high yield debt and emerging market debt” (King and Maier, 2009, p. 285). Their operational scope, the magnitude of their financial maneuvers, and their attractive returns raise questions about their implications for the stability of the broader financial system. International financial stability (FS) is a cornerstone of economic health, affecting everything from national economies to individual livelihoods (Clifford, 2008). The continuous functioning of the financial system provides essential lubrication that allows commerce, investment, and day-to-day business activities to proceed without significant disruption (Haldane, 2014). It ensures that economic actors can make financial decisions with a reasonable expectation of stability and security. However, the various instruments and strategies that hedge funds employ can introduce elements of volatility and risk, challenging the resilience of this system (Gregoriou, 2005). Thereby, financial stability is central to be considered as its fundamental precondition to achieve the central bank’s macroeconomic implications, such as price stability and a strong growing nation (Hellwig, 2014). Hence, connectedness to other financial institutions (FI) is an important determinant of financial stability (Bussière *et al.*, 2015).

Thereby, the global dimension of financial stability cannot be ignored, especially in an era of increased financial globalization. Cross-border capital flows, multinational banking operations, and interconnected financial markets mean that financial instability in one country can quickly spread to others. The global financial crisis of 2008 is a stark reminder of how interconnectedness can amplify systemic risk (Orlando, 2023). As such, international cooperation and coordination are vital in addressing global financial stability. Institutions like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which develops global standards for bank regulation, play a crucial role in fostering international regulatory harmonization and cooperation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).

## **1.2. Research**

The Research at hand is structured into different parts, starting with the literature review to provide a comprehensive examination of existing scholarly work, enabling a nuanced understanding of the topic while identifying gaps and areas for further exploration. Thereby, elucidating the current state of knowledge on hedge funds and financial stability, capturing both theoretical insights and empirical evidence. In the third part, there is the methodology of how the research is organized and the research objective as well as the Analysis

addressing the diversity within the hedge fund industry itself. Hedge funds are not a monolithic group, they encompass a wide range of strategies and investment styles, each with distinct implications for financial stability. Strategies such as long/short equity, global macro, and event-driven investing offer different risk profiles and operational dynamics. The heterogeneity within the industry necessitates a granular analysis, recognizing that certain strategies may pose greater systemic risks than others. Research studies frequently employ classification schemes and typologies to dissect the nuanced differences across various hedge fund subcategories, thereby enriching the broader discussion of their impact on financial stability. The Conclusion synthesizes these diverse viewpoints as a discussion part, followed by answering the research question of *how quickly hedge funds recover after major financial crises compared to other asset classes*.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Starting to define the terminology concerning financial systems to consider several determinants, measurements, and definitions that influence the relationship as well as the developments within this sector and create a basis for future study. Ultimately, the literature review aims to provide a comprehensive and coherent narrative that situates hedge funds within the broader discourse on financial stability. By bridging theoretical frameworks, empirical evidence, and regulatory considerations, the chapter will offer a robust foundation for understanding the complex dynamics at play. This understanding is essential for informing policy recommendations and regulatory approaches, which will be discussed in the concluding sections of this paper.

So, hedge funds and the so-called hedge fund “industry” are often described as a potential transmission channel in the event of shock (King and Maier, 2009). Thereby, hedge funds are supervised as a limited liability partnership with principals that administer the fund and are also investors (Stowell and Stowell, 2024). Controvert, to define the management of the investment instrument called hedge funds it is more complex than one single definition, described as perusing from “a plethora of investment strategies and have different risk-return profiles” (Walden and Lajbcygier, 2023, p. 152). In general, hedge funding is described as a full array of hedging techniques to reduce portfolio volatility (Bali and Weigert, 2018). With the main goal of a positive return with limited swings in value and capital preservation. However, the method behind the hedging is rapid price discovery, massive mathematical and statistical processing, risk measurement and control techniques, and leverage as well as active trading in corporate equities, bonds, foreign exchange, futures, options, swaps, forwards, and other derivatives (Chattopadhyaya, 2011).

Emerging in the mid-20th century (Adam and Merkel, 2019), hedge funds have grown significantly in both number and influence, attracting significant

sums of capital and becoming influential participants (Achleitner *et al.*, 2009). The strategy of hedge funding differs, and the management has fewer regulations compared to other investment strategies, nevertheless, some have been developed within the time being: The management of HFs is generally located onshore and registered in offshore jurisdictions including the Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Luxemburg, Dublin, or the Cayman Islands (Edwards, 1999; Carroters, 2017). This is not the case with other mutual funds or regulated private investments. Modeled themselves to fit the US exemption under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, bringing little US regulatory oversight for hedge fund industries (Bali and Weigert, 2018). 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act hedge funds are officially required registration. One point of the DFA is that investors need to have a net worth above USD one million excluding primary residence. Within private equity, stronger relations exist like the German Securities Act. Improving the creditworthiness of the transaction and thus reducing financial costs (Achleitner *et al.*, 2009). Thereby, hedge fund trading is managed by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and supervised by the National Futures Association (King and Maier, 2009).

However, modern hedge fund history began with the sociologist and financial journalist Alfred Winslow Jones while writing about market behavior, he developed his Jones Hedge Fund (Ubide, 2006). The main idea was to use the complementary nature of leverage and short selling. Jones thereby used his understanding to create a more risk-averse approach than it sounds like (Zhai and Wang, 2023). When looking at leverage increases in debt-to-equity and short selling isolated from each other it is to be an increased exposure of risk (Ubide, 2006). In comparison to the S&P 500 stock index, the management of Jones Hedge Fund shows fewer negative returns and outperformance of the S&P 500 in the years 1962 until 1968 (Ubide, 2006). The way HFs make money can be laid down for two essential reasons, including diversification and fees (Asness *et al.*, 2001). Diversification consists out of passive market exposure combined with a rather low administrative cost apparatus.

Aspects of financial stability include monetary stability, economic growth, institutions, infrastructure as well as markets and efficiency. One indicator is the “robustness of financial markets and their institutions, the state of expectations, and the reaction of central banks and other authorities” (Garbaravicius and Dierick, 2005, p. 62). The financial system is stable when it is able to promote the productivity of the economy and prevent financial imbalances (Imanov *et al.*, 2017, p. 320). Measuring the level of financial stability is complex since many actors are involved in the process and may change the supposed outcome by single agreements or actions (Agarwal *et al.*, 2009a). Including the fact banks are responsible for stability and have a systematic relevance and political

influence, as “banks are political” (Hellwig, 2014, p. 23). One example is that already simple transactions between countries, political actors, and economically dependent actors create future obligations for all involved parties (Financial Stability Forum, 2002). As a result, dependence is developed and ranges through multilateral networks where many parties interact, mostly even on an international level.

In general, two main functions within the financial system are relevant to the system of action (Sauert, 2014). The first one is the intermediation function to bring “resources accumulated by savers to investors who have identified productive uses for them” (Ubide, 2006). The second one is the payment function providing the most important means for the system to action. Whereby central banks have an essential part in decision-taking and policy implications, especially price changes and rates of exchange, inflation, interest rates, etc. (Hellwig, 2014), which is on purpose flexible to guarantee momentum. “Even though the central bank cannot go bankrupt, risks from the central bank’s assets can affect” (Hellwig, 2014, p. 11) the financial system as a whole. Importantly the clearing arrangements through which banks compensate one another for allegations arising from the payments made by their customers (Garbaravicius and Dierick, 2005). Thereby, many types of shocks increase financial stress and weaken the financial stability of households and businesses. Including systematic risks arising from correlations between counterparty credit risks and underlying risks in a complex and highly interconnected system of risk management through derivatives and other hedges (Erede, 2013). Consequently, the conditions of banks and other financial institutions will be weakened and lead to higher market interest rates as investors look for greater returns due to the perception of greater risk (Garbaravicius and Dierick, 2005). Whereas, central banks give access to financial stability reviews, including “current conditions, describe ongoing legal, regulatory, and institutional developments, and discuss proposals” (Chattopadhyaya, 2011, p. 89) to increase financial stability. Paying attention, to the need for financial institutions including the central banks can create interdependence among them by maintaining the public’s confidence to survive (Imanov *et al.*, 2017).

### **3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

The research is to be done on qualitative literature including a historical and comparative analysis. The literature will consist of several divergent sources, including literature from libraries in Germany as well as online-accessible literature such as peer-reviewed articles, books and news articles, interviews, etc. Thereby, the foremost task in crafting a robust methodology is to lay out the research design. This entails a detailed blueprint mapping the journey from problem identification to the drawing of conclusions based on empirical evidence. Reflecting on the complexities associated with hedge funds and their

potential impact on FS, a mixed-methods approach is warranted. By integrating qualitative dimensions, gaining a nuanced understanding that captures both the statistical patterns and the deeper insights into the qualitative facets of financial phenomena. This form of data provides contextual insights, allowing researchers to delve into the social, cultural, and environmental factors that shape human behavior and attitudes (Adam and Merkel, 2019).

### **3.1. Methods in research design**

Given the complexity of the topic at hand, this paper will systematically examine the development and operation of hedge funds, their interactions with the financial system, and their comparison to other asset classes. It will delve into the concept of financial stability, elucidating how hedge funds can impact stability, both positively and negatively. Through a comprehensive coding of qualitative data, this paper will aim to synthesize current knowledge and identify gaps that warrant further research.

Data collection, a cornerstone of the methodology, spans multiple sources to triangulate findings and bolster the study's credibility (Nahmias-Wolinsky, 2004). Secondary data from financial markets, enriched by proprietary datasets from regulatory bodies, provide a robust qualitative foundation. Triangulation is further achieved by integrating findings from academic literature, industry reports, and policy documents. The dynamism inherent in hedge fund operations, underscored by their diverse strategies and investment philosophies, necessitates rigorous statistical examination. A pivotal component of the methodology will be the deployment of econometric models to analyze secondary data sourced from financial databases such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. These models, augmented by time-series analysis and regression techniques, are instrumental in identifying correlations and causal relationships amid variables such as hedge fund leverage, market volatility, and overall financial stability metrics.

### **3.2. Applied Methodology**

A critical analysis of the relationship between EMH and hedge fund performance reveals inherent tensions. While EMH assumes that all available information is reflected in asset prices, hedge funds systematically profit from deviations in market valuation. Their use of short-selling, leverage, and complex derivatives positions them to exploit market frictions that traditional models overlook. Particularly during periods of market stress or dislocation, hedge funds have demonstrated their ability to generate returns that contradict EMH assumptions.

Moreover, hedge funds frequently benefit from market segmentation and information asymmetry – two conditions inconsistent with strong-form efficiency. In illiquid or opaque markets, such as high-yield credit or emerging market debt, hedge funds act as informed traders, exploiting delays in information dissemination. These dynamics illustrate that markets may be



efficient in aggregate but exhibit inefficiencies at the micro-level or within specific asset classes.

From a policy perspective, the hedge fund challenge to EMH underscores the need for refined market models that accommodate heterogeneity in information access, investor behavior, and regulatory arbitrage. This calls into question the adequacy of EMH as a sole explanatory model for modern financial markets and supports a shift toward more adaptive, empirically grounded frameworks such as Lo's Adaptive Markets Hypothesis.

Regression-based empirical studies provide additional insights into the relationship between hedge fund performance and market efficiency. Using panel data regressions and multi-factor models such as the Fama-French 3-Factor or Carhart 4-Factor model, researchers isolate hedge fund alpha by controlling for market risk, size, value, and momentum factors. Statistically significant positive alphas indicate persistent outperformance beyond what can be explained by exposure to systematic risk factors. Furthermore, time-series regressions using hedge fund return data across different volatility regimes demonstrate that hedge funds perform especially well during periods of elevated market stress, indicating their ability to exploit transient inefficiencies.

Cross-sectional regression analyses have also revealed that hedge funds with greater strategy complexity, lower liquidity, and higher manager ownership tend to exhibit stronger deviations from EMH-consistent returns. These findings support the hypothesis that certain hedge fund characteristics are systematically associated with the exploitation of market anomalies, thus challenging the assumptions of perfect information and rational pricing.

#### **4. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVE**

Examining how hedge funds recover from financial crises compared to traditional asset classes such as equities, bonds, and mutual funds. The research will evaluate the speed, magnitude, and sustainability of hedge fund rebounds after market downturns, identifying key factors that contribute to their resilience or underperformance. The thesis aims to assess the performance persistence of hedge funds and their relationship with market efficiency. Performance Persistence of Hedge Funds finds statistically significant performance persistence for hedge funds at quarterly, semi-annual, and annual periods (Lo, 2004; Winton, 2003). Investors use a quarterly momentum strategy to achieve superior returns. Thereby, some hedge fund managers consistently outperform others, challenging the idea that hedge fund returns are purely random.

The Market Efficiency applies Shiller's variance bound test to evaluate whether the JSE All Share Index follows the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Winton, 2003). Results violate Shiller's three variance inequalities, suggesting that the market shows inefficiencies. This implies that hedge fund managers may have opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies for excess returns.

Hedge fund strategies are specifically designed to identify and capitalize on **market inefficiencies**, deviations between asset prices and their fundamental values. These inefficiencies arise due to factors that are not adequately accounted for in the traditional forms of the **Efficient Market Hypothesis**:

*How do hedge fund strategies exploit market inefficiencies, and what does this imply for the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis?*

The study accounts for survivorship bias, where poorly performing funds exit databases, potentially skewing results. Backfill bias is also identified, where funds report historical performance only after achieving positive results. Adjusting for these biases ensures that the study provides a more accurate picture of hedge fund performance. So that investors can benefit from momentum-based strategies in hedge funds, particularly at quarterly horizons. The hedge fund industry can provide excess returns, but these are not purely due to manager skill, some come from market inefficiencies. Better benchmarking techniques should be developed to distinguish true alpha from beta-driven returns. Regulators should ensure transparent performance reporting to reduce survivorship and backfill bias.

## 5. HEDGE FUNDS: VALIDITY OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS

The hedge fund industry has been the subject of various academic studies focusing on performance analysis, regulatory frameworks, and market dynamics. Several key pieces of literature provide insights into these areas. First, the **performance analysis of HFs**, whereby a comprehensive study examined the performance of hedge funds with the validity of the efficient market hypothesis.

**Table 1. Efficient Market Hypothesis and Hedge Fund Reality**

<b>Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)</b>	<b>Hedge Fund Reality</b>
Markets instantly reflect all available information	Markets exhibit temporary inefficiencies and mispricing
Consistent outperformance is impossible	Hedge funds often generate alpha through active strategies
Prices follow a rational and efficient process	Markets are influenced by behavioral biases and shocks
Arbitrage opportunities are rare and quickly disappear	Hedge funds exploit persistent arbitrage opportunities
Crises are absorbed smoothly and efficiently	Hedge funds show adaptive behavior and profit from dislocations
Passive investing is sufficient	Hedge funds rely on active, research-driven management

Source: summarized from: Garbaravicius, T. and Dierick, F. (2005). Hedge Funds and Their Implications for Financial Stability. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

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Hedge fund strategies are specifically designed to identify and capitalize on market inefficiencies, deviations between asset prices and their fundamental values as summarized in Table 1 (Winton, 2003). These inefficiencies arise due to factors such as information asymmetries, behavioral biases, liquidity constraints, and regulatory frictions, all of which are not adequately accounted for in the traditional forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970; Fama and French, 2010).

The **volatility and Hedge Fund performance (see Tables 1 and 2)** focus on the impact of market volatility on the performance of hedge funds. By incorporating a volatility index into the CAPM, the research aimed to determine how different hedge fund strategies perform under varying volatility conditions (Fieldhouse, 2024). The study highlighted the importance of considering volatility in investment decisions and suggested that certain strategies might be better suited for periods of heightened market fluctuations (Agarwal *et al.*, 2009; De Freitas, 2022). Whereby the **regulatory framework and retail participation** shows the regulation of hedge funds has evolved to balance investor protection with market growth. Research assessing the country's regulatory practices, especially concerning retail participation, indicates that the framework aligns well with international standards (Fieldhouse, 2024). The studies emphasize the need for a regulatory environment that safeguards investors while allowing access to the benefits of hedge fund investments.

**Table 2. Historical Recovery Times**

Crisis Period	2003 Global Financial Crisis	2020 COVID-19 Crisis
<b>Equity Market Decline</b>	-38% (S&P 500)	Over -20% (Q1 2020)
<b>Average</b>	-18%	Low single digits
<b>Best Performing HF Strategies</b>	Macro, Managed Futures	Multi-strategy, macro
<b>Average HF Recovery Time</b>	3-4 years	Same year (2020)
<b>Equity Market Recovery Time</b>	5-6 years	1-2 years
<b>Notable Features</b>	Risk-adjusted alpha confirmed by regression management	Rapid recovery, strong downside protection in volatile markets

Source: Aragon *et al.* (2024). Hedge Fund Liquidity Management: Insights for Fund Performance and Financial Stability. *U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC.gov*. [online] Available at: <https://www.sec.gov/about/divisions-offices/division-economic-risk-analysis/staff-papers-analyses/hedge-fund-liquidity-management-insights-fund-performance-financial-stability> [Accessed 02.05.2025].

The consistent ability of hedge funds to generate positive alpha, especially during times of market stress or structural change, presents a challenge to the EMH (see Table 1), particularly in its semi-strong and strong forms (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). While weak-form efficiency (based on historical price data) may still hold in liquid markets, the real-world success of hedge funds suggests that markets are only partially efficient and prone to temporary dislocations (Lo, 2004).

This leads to several implications. First, markets may be efficient on average, but not always or everywhere. Second, information is not symmetrically distributed, and hedge funds invest heavily in research, networks, and technology to gain an informational edge. Third, behavioral finance and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo, 2004) offer better explanatory power than strict EMH assumptions (see Table 1), accounting for periods of irrationality and structural shifts.

Hedge fund performance during financial crises reveals an above-average ability to withstand market turbulence and recover faster than traditional asset classes such as equities and bonds. During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the average hedge fund declined by approximately 18%, while the S&P 500 fell by 38 percent. Despite the drawdown, many hedge funds, particularly macro and managed futures strategies, posted positive or near-neutral returns.

Empirical data show that hedge funds, on average, recovered their pre-crisis net asset values within 3 to 4 years, compared to 5 to 6 years for equity markets, as shown in Table 2. Regression analyses using Fama-French and Carhart factor models confirm that hedge funds deliver risk-adjusted returns (alpha) even in turbulent markets. Furthermore, their use of active risk management tools, short positions, and diversified investment universes allows them to mitigate losses and rebalance more rapidly.

In the COVID-19 crisis of 2020, many hedge funds again demonstrated resilience: while global equity indices dropped over 20 percent in Q1 (see Table 2), several hedge fund strategies limited losses to low single digits. Recovery was faster, with many hedge funds achieving full recovery within the same calendar year.

## **6. DISCUSSION**

Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve System, mentioned that hedge funds “have become major contributors to the flexibility of the financial system” (Agarwal *et al.*, 2009, p. 123). Thus, hedge funds not only provide an investment with potentially attractive returns but also offer an investment that does not correlate with most traditional portfolios (Asness *et al.*, 2001). As seen in American economics, hedge funds have been used as a financial means to support a stable interest rate beyond history (Mallaby, 2019, p. 213). Thus, hedge funds come with light regulatory oversight, and their

participation in various markets has been proven fundamental. Achleitner et al. propose that the increasing provision of liquidity, made financial markets more efficient and resilient to financial shocks in the past years, including the most recent financial crisis (Achleitner *et al.*, 2009).

Contrary, beginning with the first hedge fund of A. W. Jones uses leverage to have sustainable and substantial capacities for bigger trades, on the other side, being described as risky, especially in times of crisis when investors want their money back (Mallaby, 2019). Claiming that hedge funds are large enough to destabilize markets or even provoke financial crises. Such ongoing concern about the vulnerability, paired with the tremendous development and opaque nature of hedge funds, emphasize their probable threat to financial stability (Erede, 2013) combined with its close relationships with other financial institutions such as prime brokers (Bussière *et al.*, 2015). As stated by Walden and Lajbcygier (2023), there is a “lack of transparency within the hedge fund industry, especially when it comes to pricing, especially fees for the managers” (Walden and Lajbcygier, 2023, p. 154). This makes the process speculative and difficult for regulators and other market participants to assess the potential risks HFs pose to financial stability. The literature on systemic risk provides valuable insights into how interconnectedness and common exposures among financial institutions can propagate shocks throughout the financial system (Aramonte *et al.*, 2023). Studies such as those by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and Acharya *et al.* (2010) highlight the systemic risk posed by institutions that are highly leveraged and interconnected, as is often the case with hedge funds. These risks are further magnified in times of market stress, when forced deleveraging and fire sales can precipitate sharp declines in asset prices, thereby exacerbating market turmoil (Aramonte *et al.*, 2023).

## 7. CONCLUSION

Hedge funds play a vital role in modern financial markets by enhancing liquidity, improving price efficiency, and providing diversification benefits to investors. Their ability to generate alpha through sophisticated strategies makes them an essential component of institutional portfolios. However, hedge fund volatility is highly dependent on the strategy employed, ranging from low-risk arbitrage approaches to high-risk leveraged trading. While hedge funds can act as stabilizers in financial markets, they can also contribute to volatility, especially when leverage and liquidity risks are involved. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for investors seeking to optimize risk-adjusted returns in hedge fund investments.

In conclusion, hedge funds' exploitation of market inefficiencies does not invalidate EMH entirely but demonstrates its limitations in dynamic, complex, and crisis-prone market environments. Hedge funds recover more quickly after financial crises than traditional asset classes due to their flexible strategies,

dynamic risk management, and ability to exploit market dislocations. This recovery pattern suggests that hedge funds are not only reactive but also adaptive actors within the financial system. Their performance during and after crises challenges the assumptions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Lo, 2004), particularly the notion that markets instantly reflect all relevant information.

Instead, the evidence supports a more nuanced view: markets are prone to temporary inefficiencies, and hedge funds are among the best-positioned actors to identify and profit from them. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating alternative asset classes in portfolio diversification and reinforce the need for adaptive market theories that align with empirical realities.

Overall, an extensive body of literature examines hedge funds from multiple perspectives, including their role in promoting market efficiency, their contribution to liquidity, and their potential to exacerbate financial instability. Scholars have debated whether hedge funds serve as stabilizers or destabilizers within financial markets (Lu *et al.*, 2024). On one hand, proponents argue that hedge funds enhance market efficiency through sophisticated arbitrage strategies, liquidity provision, and the active management of risk (Zhai and Wang, 2023). By capitalizing on mispricing and market inefficiencies, hedge funds ostensibly contribute to a more accurate reflection of asset values and, in turn, to overall market stability.

### **Further studies**

Recent studies have delved into the intricate relationship between hedge fund volatility and financial stability, offering nuanced insights into how hedge fund activities can influence market dynamics. The ECB has examined the dual role of hedge funds in financial markets (Ferrara *et al.*, 2024). While hedge funds can enhance market efficiency and liquidity, their significant presence, especially in the euro area government bond markets, raises concerns about potential volatility amplification (European Central Bank, 2007).

The ECB's analysis indicates that although hedge funds contribute to market depth, their rapid withdrawal during periods of stress could exacerbate market volatility. This underscores the importance of monitoring hedge fund activities to maintain financial stability. The U.S. SEC has explored how hedge funds manage liquidity, particularly when holding illiquid assets. Findings suggest that hedge funds with lower-than-expected liquidity buffers may outperform benchmarks under normal conditions. However, during market crises, such as the one experienced in 2020, these funds are more susceptible to forced asset sales, which can trigger broader market disruptions. This highlights a policy trade-off: while lower liquidity buffers can enhance returns in stable markets, they may pose systemic risks during periods of financial stress (Aragon *et al.*, 2024).

Research from the Office of Financial Research delves into the risk-shifting behaviors of hedge funds, particularly following periods of underperformance. The study reveals that hedge funds may adjust their risk profiles by altering portfolio volatility, influenced by factors such as investor redemption terms, ownership concentration, and leverage. Understanding these behaviors is crucial, as they can have significant implications for market stability, especially if multiple funds engage in similar strategies simultaneously (Andrews and Gadgil, 2024).

A study published in the *Review of Finance* examines the relationship between hedge funds' idiosyncratic volatility and their future risk-adjusted returns. The research indicates that hedge funds exhibiting higher idiosyncratic volatility tend to achieve superior future risk-adjusted returns compared to their lower-volatility counterparts. This finding suggests that embracing certain levels of idiosyncratic risk may be a deliberate strategy employed by hedge funds to enhance performance (Bali and Weigert, 2024).

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